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2 Embedded Property 
 




Introduction: private property, common property,  
and condominium1 
 
The institution of property arises in the tension between autonomy and 
community. It serves not simply to demarcate spaces of individual control and 
authority, but also to balance individual with collective interests. This balance 
swings, the weight shifting towards individual or collective, and the 
movement is perhaps most apparent across the space between private 
property and common property. To hold private property is to be recognized 
as the owner and to enjoy the benefits of ownership, including a considerable 
degree of control over the use of the owned resource. The emphasis, as 
William Blackstone’s famous ‘sole and despotic dominion’ characterization 
announces, is on the owner, ‘in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe’.2 On the other hand, common property establishes 
rights for members of a group to use and access resources, subject to 
collectively prescribed rules. Here the focus tends towards the decision-
making of the group, not the individual, and, following Elinor Ostrom’s 
influential work, to the institutions of collective action.3 
Private property and common property emphasize individual and 
collective interests respectively, but the bifurcation may not be as stark as it 
appears. Common property suggests the prominence of collective control, but 
it also creates, in CB MacPherson’s helpful formulation, an individual right not 
to be excluded,4 and in democratically governed communities, an individual 
right to participate in governing the uses of common-pool resources. As a 
result, common property can serve an important role in protecting and 
securing individual interests, even if it is the collective, rather than the 
individual, with decision-making authority. Conversely, understandings of 
private property have tended to emphasize variations of an owner’s right to 
exclude, but not untrammelled decision-making authority or even the 
absence of community. Indeed, many, including Blackstone, recognize ‘sole 
and despotic dominion’ as a caricature of the institution of private property, 
which is never absolute or entirely separate from, but instead always 
dependent on and supporting community.5 
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Condominium, as an architecture of land ownership, engages directly 
with the tension between autonomy and community by creating and 
combining private property and common property interests, and then by 
allocating democratic rights to the owners of these interests to participate in 
governing their uses. It is one among a number of legal forms, including 
cooperative and homeowners association, that are deployed in multi-unit 
developments to create spheres of individual control and responsibility within 
a self-governing community.6  It is the legal separateness of the individual 
units that distinguishes condominium from cooperative, and the co-
ownership interests in common property that marks condominium as 
different from the homeowners association. Cornelius van der Merwe 
describes condominium as embodying a dualistic approach to ownership in 
multi-unit developments to signal that each owner holds two distinct property 
interests: a separate title to a particular unit and a co-ownership interest in 
the common property, held in common with the other title holders.7 
Condominium constructs separate titles to individual units, and these 
private interests are carefully mapped in a constituting plan that marks their 
boundaries. However, notwithstanding their legal separateness, the private 
interests are inseparable from the common property interests; their 
ownership cannot be severed from the accompanying rights to undivided 
shares of the common property. Moreover, this packaging of private with 
common property reflects a physical entwining: the individual units rely on 
the common property, which exists to support, to shelter, to secure access to, 
and as an amenity for, the privately held units. Indeed, the private property 
within condominium cannot exist without the common property, which exists 
in service of the private. The corollary of this entitlement is an obligation on 
the unit owners to share the costs of maintaining and, when necessary, 
replacing the common property. The owners of individual units, as co-owners 
of the common property, must contribute, in proportion to their shares, to its 
upkeep. 
Democratic rights, usually conveyed in the form of shares in a 
condominium corporation, are the third element of ownership within 
condominium. Each unit is typically allotted one vote, but other arrangements 
are possible, including voting rights based on relative floor areas of individual 
units or the proportions of common property ownership.8 These voting rights, 
which confer the opportunity to participate in the governance of the private 
and common property, are an integral part of ownership within 
condominium, but the binding that holds them to the property interests can 
be loosened in certain, albeit rare circumstances, to permit a tenant or a 
creditor to assume an owner’s voting rights. Apart from these few instances 
where voting rights may be detached temporarily, and usually only partially, 
from the status of owner, the right to participate in a democracy of owners is 
part of the condominium package. 
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What I have described in the preceding paragraphs is an architecture 
of ownership that constructs a form of embedded property. Condominium 
binds private property with common property and democratic rights to lodge 
the private interests within a community of owners. The private interests are 
constructed by, and only exist within, condominium. One might point out, as 
many have, that private property is always embedded within community, that 
even outside condominium ‘property is a sociable institution, depending on 
the recognition and respect of others’, 9  or that ‘property is not just an 
individual entitlement but a social institution involving many owners’. 10 
However, condominium not only constructs private interests, but also the 
immediate community in which they are embedded. Moreover, it is 
impossible to disembed those private interests; the private property of 
condominium only exists within condominium. 
In this chapter, I offer the concept of embedded property as a way of 
thinking about and understanding condominium property, and of explaining 
how ownership of land within condominium is changing the character of 
ownership. I do so in the next section by describing property within 
condominium as spatially embedded, politically embedded, and temporally 
embedded, and then by demonstrating how these different, albeit 
overlapping, modes by which condominium embeds property are forcing 
courts and legislatures to reconsider long-accepted and well-understood 
incidents or attributes of land ownership. In identifying the spatial embedding 
of condominium property and its impact on understandings of ownership, I 
review the judicial responses in the Canadian provinces of Ontario and British 
Columbia to the chronic anti-social behaviour of individual owners. To 
consider the political embedding, I turn to the legislative framework and 
judicial decisions from several Australian states and Canadian provinces 
involving disputes over the capacity of condominium corporations to restrict 
rentals, particularly short-term rentals. Finally, I describe and consider the 
temporal embedding of condominium property through a discussion of the 
shift in many statutory condominium jurisdictions away from a presumption 
that the dissolution of condominium requires the unanimous consent of 
owners, to a presumption that dissolution, and thus the termination of private 
property interests within condominium, may proceed on the basis of a 
supermajority vote. 
The analysis reveals that the spatial, political, and temporal 
embedding of property is straining accepted understandings of land 
ownership, and judges and legislators are responding to this pressure by 
changing the character of ownership in land. Moreover, these changes are not 
simply modifications of doctrine and should not be discounted merely as 
technical changes; instead, they should also be understood as precipitating 
significant changes in the role and function of property. As Cathy Sherry has 
argued regarding Australian condominium legislation and case law, ‘we must 
be conscious of the ways in which we are straying from orthodox rules of 
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property and the consequences of that divergence.’ 11  In the concluding 
section, I suggest that the surge towards condominium as the preferred 
architecture of ownership in many jurisdictions around the world over the 
past 50 years is precipitating a transformation in the institution of property in 
land, and, not only for land within condominium. I also raise the paradox of 
condominium—that the embedding of property within condominium is also 
creating the capacity for communities of owners to disembed themselves 
from the larger public realm. 
Embedded Property 
 
As an architecture of ownership that binds private property with common 
property and democratic rights to participate in a governing body, 
condominium produces property interests that are embedded within a 
community of owners. This embedding occurs in the creation of a 
condominium development, fixing the private interests within the legal form, 
but the embedding is also a process that continues to shape the nature and 
character of property and of ownership. The form of that embedding may 
usefully be described as occurring in spatial, political, and temporal modes. 
Within condominium, property is spatially, politically, and temporally 
embedded, and each mode of embedding is acting on the institution of 
ownership. 
 
Spatially embedded  
 
“Blackacre” has long served common law lawyers, judges, and scholars as the 
imagined parcel of land in innumerable property law hypotheticals. 12  The 
image that it conveys, or at least that I have always imagined, of a fenced rural 
acre, emphasizes the separateness and apartness of the land and its owner. 
Indeed, understandings of ownership built around Blackacre as the 
hypothetical object of property tend to identify a singular owner, “A”, and to 
prioritize variations of the right to exclude as the irreducible core of 
property.13 Amnon Lehavi has pointed to the limitations of what he describes 
as the “Blackacre Paradigm,” arguing that it suggests a detachment of 
property from community, a singularity of ownership, and a purity of private 
property that belie contemporary patterns of ownership.14 Lehavi and others 
have turned to common interest communities, with their packaging of private 
property, common property, and democratic rights as a principal exhibit in 
their efforts to shift some of the emphasis in definitions of property away 
from the individual and the right to exclude.15 
However, Blackacre does more symbolic work that has yet to be 
noticed: it conjures an image of owners spread in a single layer or stratum 
over the surface of the earth, separated by a fence or some other boundary 
marker which can be represented on a two-dimensional map. Blackacre 
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suggests the possibility of a neighbouring Whiteacre or Greenacre on the 
other side of a fence. It is much harder to imagine a neighbouring, coloured-
acre that occupies territory above or below Blackacre. Subsurface and 
airspace rights are possible, of course, but they usually appear as tangential 
to, or derivative of, the surface interest in Blackacre. As a result, this 
hypothetical object of ownership constructs a particular spatial arrangement 
of landowners, and this arrangement produces the imagined space in which 
the law of property and the institution of ownership have developed. 
Blackacre does not work as the hypothetical parcel of land within 
condominium. To begin with, condominium requires a built structure, not 
open fields; the subdivision of land into smaller parcels within condominium 
is only permitted once the spatial boundaries of those parcels have been 
defined by the floors, walls, and ceilings of a building. 16  In addition, 
condominium transforms the spatial context of property by facilitating an 
extraordinary increase in the density of parcels and thus, of owners. This is 
most apparent in the condominium apartment tower. Where there was once 
a single parcel of land marked over a section of the surface of the earth, within 
condominium there may now be tens or even hundreds of parcels, stacked in 
a vertical column and sharing not only a fence line but also floors, walls, and 
ceilings, and much other infrastructure besides. The stacking of parcels 
enables the stacking of owners. Indeed, condominium facilitates a spatial 
reconfiguration of property interests and their owners, creating a previously 
unimaginable density and proximity, and this spatial embedding produces a 
dramatically different context in which the institution of ownership must 
operate. Not surprisingly, courts and legislatures have responded to the 
spatial embedding of property by revisiting and reshaping what it means to 
be an owner of an interest in land. This is evident in the judicial treatment of 
chronic anti-social behaviour within condominium. 
 
Chronic anti-social behaviour 
 
Proximity creates challenge. In 2010, a court in the Canadian province of 
Ontario evicted an owner from her condominium unit and ordered that she 
sell it within three months because of her chronic anti-social behaviour.17 The 
behaviour included 
 
physical assaults on other unit holders, acts of mischief against their 
property, racist and homophobic slurs and threats repeatedly made 
against other unit holders, playing extremely loud music at night, 
watching and besetting other unit holders and using her large and 




The court concluded that the only viable remedy for the other 33 unit owners 
within the townhouse condominium complex was to expel the offending 
owner, and it found the authority to make such an order in the province’s 
condominium legislation.19 
Several years later, the courts in British Columbia arrived at a similar 
conclusion in a case involving a volatile relationship between a mother and 
adult son, and the impact of their behaviour on the other residents in a 132-
unit condominium complex in the City of Surrey, a suburb of Vancouver.20 In 
addition to frequent and loud altercations between mother and son, the adult 
son had abused and harassed other residents with foul language, obscene 
gestures, and intimidating behaviour. The behaviour had continued over four 
years, notwithstanding frequent warnings from the strata corporation, fines 
amounting to more than $20,000, and court orders to cease. Eventually, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed a lower court’s eviction and sale 
order, but indicated that the province’s condominium legislation only 
permitted such an order where an owner was in contempt of a prior court 
order to comply with the legislation or condominium bylaws.21 
When I first wrote about these decisions in 2016, I counted ten 
reported decisions, including the two discussed above, in which Ontario and 
British Columbia courts had granted eviction and sale orders against owners 
within condominium for chronic anti-social behaviour.22 Since then, there are 
two more reported decisions, one from each jurisdiction, in which the courts 
have concluded that an eviction and sale order is an appropriate remedy for 
those owners seeking relief from another owner’s chronic anti-social 
behaviour.23  Perhaps in recognition of the severity of such an order, the 
British Columbia Supreme Court in its most recent decision indicated that 
owners seeking an eviction and sale order against another owner must 
establish ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’—the standard of proof in criminal 
law—that the offending owner was in contempt of a prior court order.24 
In addition to these judicial decisions, the relatively recent overhaul of 
Ontario’s Condominium Act included statutory direction about the 
appropriate use of permanent eviction orders.25 Courts must only make such 
an order where a person’s conduct ‘poses a serious risk’ to health and safety 
or damage to property.26 Moreover, the conduct must demonstrate that ‘the 
person is unsuited for the communal occupation of the property or the 
communal use of the property’ and ‘no other order will be adequate’.27 The 
amendment makes no mention of sale orders and, although passed in 2015, 
has yet to be proclaimed into force. 
By removing the immunity of an owner from eviction and forced sale 
for chronic anti-social behaviour, the courts have diverged from long-held and 
well-established conceptions within the common law of what it means to be 
an owner of an interest in land. Title holders outside condominium might face 
criminal penalty or civil sanction, such as liability in nuisance, for chronic anti-
social behaviour, but not an eviction and sale order. The spatial dispersion of 
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property interests within the Blackacre paradigm serves to insulate owners 
from the behaviour of neighbours, and this has shaped a construction of 
ownership which does not include minimum standards of personal behaviour 
to maintain the status of owner. That this is no longer the case, at least in 
Ontario and British Columbia, is a fundamental change in the nature and 
quality of ownership. Ownership now includes access to a new remedy—an 
order to expel a neighbour from condominium for chronic anti-social 
behaviour. Ownership has also become more precarious, at least for some, 
because contingent on a minimum standard of personal behaviour.28  This 
change in what it means to be an owner is, at least in part, a judicial response 




One of the prominent figures in the body of thought that came to be known 
as liberalism, John Locke created a powerful illusion that private property 
might be acquired simply through the actions of individuals.29 In his parable 
of the origins of private property, humans owned their bodies and thus the 
labour of their bodies, God had given the world to humankind in common, 
and an individual might, by mixing their labour with the things of the world, 
claim a property interest in those things. There were limitations to this labour 
theory of property, but the effect was that property interests might be 
understood as arising prior to society, and by extension, that the primary role 
of society, and ultimately of the state, was to protect those prior interests.  
Although powerfully resonant in western societies and serving as an 
intellectual foundation for a ‘bottom-up’ origin story of property rights,30 the 
assertion within Locke’s labour theory of property for a pre-social acquisition 
of property was only ever an illusion. Most minimally, the claim to property, 
and thus to an enforceable right, requires a community that is prepared to 
recognize and acknowledge—to be persuaded of, in Carol Rose’s 
formulation—something more than mere possession.31 Jeremy Waldron goes 
further, arguing the individualist account of property fails to recognize that 
the private rights of property rely and depend upon on the public realm, such 
that the institution of property is ‘an artifact of the interaction of public law 
and private law’.32 The private entitlements of property are never solely the 
product of private actions but always involve the public realm, something that 
Joseph Singer captures in his description of property as ‘a social and political 
institution and not merely an individual entitlement’.33 
This characterization of property as the product of private and public 
realms speaks directly to condominium property. Indeed, whatever the 
strength of the Lockean illusion in providing a justification for private 
property, any pretence of private property as something that is separate from, 
or prior to, society is impossible to sustain within condominium. 
Condominium produces property interests and it embeds those interests 
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within a community of owners with the power to govern the uses of that 
property.34  This political embedding is a function of ownership; residency 
within the community is largely immaterial. Tenants do not enjoy the right to 
participate; the democratic rights within condominium derive from 
ownership. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the possibility of tenants, and 
thus of an owner’s right to rent or lease their property, depends on the 
community of owners. Where the statutory framework permits, the 
community of owners may decide to restrict or even to prohibit rentals, 
thereby curtailing one of the means by which to alienate interests in land and 





Short-term rentals prohibited. This was the decision of the owners in a 351-
unit mixed residential and retail condominium development—the Watergate 
Apartments—in the Australian city of Melbourne when, at the first meeting 
of the owners corporation in 2004, they voted for a rule banning the rental of 
units for less than one month.35 Notwithstanding the prohibition, one owner 
acquired 14 apartments within the development and, over a period of eight 
and a half years, arranged 3,500 bookings and hosted 10,500 guests in those 
units for periods as short as seven days.36 In 2014, the owners corporation 
sought an order that the owner stop using the units in violation of the short-
term rental prohibition. However, the Supreme Court of Victoria denied the 
order, ruling instead that the owners corporation had exceeded its jurisdiction 
in attempting to prohibit short-term rentals. At the heart of the decision was 
the court’s view that such a substantial interference ‘with lot owners’ 
proprietary rights’ required ‘clear and unambiguous language’ in the 
empowering legislation.37 The power of the group of owners to diminish their 
individual rights as owners by restricting the power to lease their units was so 
significant an infringement of the rights of ownership that it could only occur 
under specific and explicit statutory direction.38 
The strong protection in the state of Victoria for individual property 
rights within condominium, and for the right to lease units in particular, places 
the jurisdiction at one end of a spectrum in the balance between protecting 
the rights of individual owners and empowering the group of owners to place 
limits on those rights. Somewhere in the middle of that spectrum is the 
Canadian province of Ontario. In 1974, the Ontario Superior Court ruled that 
the province’s condominium legislation did not permit a condominium 
corporation to prohibit the rental of individual units.39 In doing so, the court 




One of the fundamental incidents of ownership is the right to alienate 
the property that one owns. With respect to real property the right to 
freely alienate dates to 1290, when the Imperial Statute of Quia 
Emptores, 18 Edw. I, was enacted.40 
 
The right of a condominium corporation to curtail such a long-standing and 
well-established incident of ownership required ‘clear, unambiguous 
language' that, the court ruled, was not present in Ontario’s condominium 
legislation.41 However, just over four decades later, in 2016, the same year as 
the decision of the Victoria Supreme Court involving the Watergate 
Apartments, the Ontario Superior Court confirmed the power of 
condominium corporations to prohibit short-term rentals.42 In doing so, the 
court ruled that the prohibition on rentals for periods of fewer than four 
months was ‘not so overly restrictive as to completely negate or 
fundamentally alter the right of owners to lease their units’.43 
At the other end of the spectrum is the Canadian province of British 
Columbia. When uncertainty arose in the courts in the 1980s over whether 
the province’s condominium legislation enabled owners to prohibit rentals, 
the government re-wrote the statutory provision to confirm that strata 
corporations could restrict and even prohibit rentals.44 This capacity extends 
to short-term accommodation, and in order that strata corporations might 
create effective sanctions to dissuade owners from short-term rentals, the 
province recently increased the maximum fine that a strata corporation might 
levy for a violation of a short-term rental bylaw from $200 once every seven 
days, which was viewed by some as a small cost of doing business, to $1000 
for every day that an infraction continues.45 Some municipalities in British 
Columbia have introduced bylaws that permit short-term rentals of principal 
residences only, 46  but owners within condominium may go further, 
prohibiting rentals entirely. 
Property within condominium is embedded within a political 
community of owners with the capacity to make and enforce rules over the 
use of property. This political community is private in the sense that the right 
to participate flows from ownership; it is democratic in that owners have 
votes to elect a governing council or board and to set the rules.47 The rules of 
these private, democratically governed communities can be invasive, and, in 
some jurisdictions, may extend the rules set out in the bylaws of public 
governments at the local or municipal level. In those jurisdictions that permit 
rental restrictions or even prohibitions, the political embedding of property 
within a community of owners empowers that community to curtail what has 
long been understood as a fundamental incident of ownership of land: the 





In common law jurisdictions, the doctrine of estates constructs time as the 
measure for possessory interests in land. In place of ‘the holistic ideas of 
dominion’ or ‘any overarching notion of ownership’ that exist in civil law 
traditions, 48  the common law, note Kevin and Susan Gray, employs the 
doctrine of estates to fashion the object of ownership as ‘a slice of time in the 
land’.49 Within this temporal framework, the freehold estate known as the fee 
simple is the largest estate because it has the potential to last forever, an idea 
expressed in the often-cited and elegant passage from the early modern 
English courts:  
 
[T]he land itself is one thing, and the estate in land is another thing, 
for an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time, and 
there are diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of 
time, for he who has a fee-simple in land has a time in the land 
without end, or the land for a time without end.50 
 
The potential of a fee simple estate to last forever will not be realized 
if its current holder dies without heirs. In this circumstance, the doctrine of 
tenure—that all land is held of the Crown—operates to return the estate to 
the Crown through the ancient feudal incident of tenure known as escheat. In 
addition, property may be taken, usually by a public entity, for a public 
purpose, and with fair compensation, under laws, variously labelled, of 
expropriation, compulsory acquisition, or eminent domain. In many 
jurisdictions, the basic framework for the taking of property without consent 
is set out in constitutional provisions, reflecting the importance placed on the 
appropriate balance between private rights and public interests in land. 
The private property interests that condominium constructs have the 
potential to last forever.51 In common law jurisdictions, condominium creates 
separate freehold or fee simple interests in individual units, and the statutory 
condominium regimes declare these freehold interests to have the same 
character and quality as freehold interests outside condominium.52 Similarly, 
the condominium form itself has the potential to last forever; as with business 
corporations, there is no natural or pre-determined end date for a 
condominium development and the corporation that serves as the governing 
entity. But just as business corporations may be wound-up, so too a 
condominium development may be dissolved. This involves the cancelation of 
the plan or other constituting document, and, most importantly, the 
termination of the private property interests that it created. Those interests 
depend on the larger form for their existence. The legal architecture of 
condominium creates them; without that structure, they cease to exist. In this 
sense, condominium embeds the property interests that it creates within its 
temporal frame. This temporal embedding means that the decision to dissolve 




Dissolution and collective sale 
 
Should we sell the building? At some point in the lifecycle of a condominium 
development, unit owners will confront the question of whether they, as a 
group, should proceed with a collective sale.53 Indeed, unit owners in many 
condominium developments have reached this point already, a not 
unsurprising development given that condominium statutes are now more 
than 50 years old in most jurisdictions and an increasing number of 
developments that deployed the legal form require extensive and expensive 
renovations of the common property, including roofs, heating and cooling 
systems, elevators, exterior windows and siding, and more. Moreover, 
condominium developments exist within neighbourhoods, cities, and 
metropolitan regions that change, as do the zoning rules, turning parcels of 
land into enticing targets for redevelopment. A land developer’s offer that 
includes a significant premium on individual unit values if the units are sold 
collectively is a common tipping point that prompts a collective sale. 
The dissolution of condominium involves cancelling the constituting 
plan, winding up the condominium corporation, and terminating the private 
interests in individual units. In what is usually a transitory step to facilitate a 
collective sale, the former unit owners within condominium become co-
owners of all the property, including that which they had owned individually. 
The decision to dissolve condominium, and thus to terminate individual 
interests in land, is probably the single most important decision in the lifecycle 
of a condominium development. For this reason, the process by which this 
decision is reached, and the required threshold of consent among owners, is 
crucial, not only for understanding the rights of individual property owners, 
but also for determining the character of ownership within condominium. 
Statutory condominium regimes around the world have generally adopted 
either a presumption that the dissolution of condominium requires 
unanimous consent (with an option to seek a court order to dissolve 
condominium if unanimity is not possible) or a presumption that dissolution 
may proceed with the consent of a supermajority of owners, usually 75 or 80 
percent (with varying degrees of protection for the dissenting minority).54 
In the last 20 years, there has been a significant shift among statutory 
condominium jurisdictions away from a presumption that owners could insist 
on their consent, to a presumption that the consent of a supermajority of 
owners is sufficient. Hong Kong introduced a 90 percent dissolution threshold 
in 1998,55  and Singapore followed a year later, introducing supermajority 
thresholds of 80 and 90 percent, depending on the age of the building.56 In 
the US, Florida adopted an 80 percent threshold in 2007,57 and the following 
year the Uniform Law Commission recommended, through its Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act, that states adopt an 80 percent threshold, 
although it also suggested that residential common interest communities 
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should have the option to raise that threshold.58 New Zealand adopted a 75 
percent threshold in 2010, 59  and Hong Kong amended its legislation, 
introducing a tiered regime that lowered the threshold for some buildings to 
80 percent. 60  Among Australian states, in 2014 the Northern Territory 
introduced a sliding threshold of 80 to 95 percent, depending on the age of 
the development;61 New South Wales implemented a 75 percent threshold in 
2017;62 and Queensland is considering a similar proposal. 63 In the Canadian 
context, British Columbia introduced an 80 percent threshold in 2016.64 
The title of the Hong Kong’s legislation—Land (Compulsory Sale for 
Redevelopment) Ordinance—is revealing for its labelling of the shift to a 
supermajority threshold as a form of compulsory sale. As Nicole Gilewicz and 
I have argued elsewhere, the move to non-consensual dissolution is a shift 
that permits a form of private-to-private taking in which some owners may 
terminate the property interests of their neighbours.65 The dissenting owners 
will be compensated for the loss of their interest, and the level of 
compensation for each owner in a collective sale will commonly exceed the 
sum that each owner would receive were they to sell their units individually, 
but nonetheless, their interests will be terminated involuntarily. Hazel 
Easthope describes this change to supermajority consent in order to dissolve 
condominium as challenging ‘deep-seated ideals around the nature of home 
ownership, and particularly the assumption that ownership is associated with 
stability and control over what happens to one’s property.’66 Neighbours are 
empowered to take the property of neighbours, usually to maximize the 
exchange value of land for all owners, including those opposed to the sale, 
but at the cost of the loss of security, which has commonly accompanied, and 
been an important feature of, the ownership of land. 
Condominium produces private interests in land that have the 
potential to last forever, but that will not survive the dissolution of the legal 
form that creates them. This temporal embedding of property within 
condominium places the longevity of property interests in the hands of the 
community of owners. As a result, the shift in many jurisdictions from a 
presumption that the dissolution of condominium requires the unanimous 
consent of owners to a presumption that a supermajority vote among owners 
is sufficient is not simply a technical change; it remakes the meaning of 
ownership.67  The effect is to enhance the exchange value of property, by 
facilitating its redevelopment, but to undermine the security that comes with 
the right of an owner to insist that their property can be transferred only with 
their consent. 
 
Conclusion: embedding and disembedding property 
 
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi dangled an enticing metaphor in 
suggesting that the nineteenth century push among northern European states 
to construct self-regulating markets, animated by the principle of individual 
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gain and governed only by the price mechanism, served to disembed markets 
from society.68 This disembedding of markets from social and legal constraints 
had contributed to the creation of great wealth, he continued, and was 
integral to a system that had, for a time, produced unprecedented peace and 
political stability in Europe, but Polanyi argued that it also caused horrendous 
working and living conditions and the devastation of natural environments. 
The consequences when the system collapsed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, argued Polanyi, were two world wars, the great 
depression, and the rise of fascism and communism. 
Although I employ the metaphor differently, Polanyi’s embeddedness 
provided the spark for thinking about condominium as embedded property.69 
Condominium constructs a form of ownership that embeds property in a 
community of owners. In this chapter I have outlined the spatial, political, and 
temporal modes of that embedding. Moreover, the effect of that embedding 
has been to precipitate a series of fundamental changes in the character of 
land ownership. Ownership within condominium may now require a minimum 
standard of personal behaviour to retain the status of owner (following the 
use of eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour), it may no longer 
have incidents that have been long associated with property (because of 
restrictions imposed by the community of owners on the right to alienate), 
and it may be terminated by neighbours without consent (where dissolution 
proceeds on the basis of a supermajority vote). The embedding of property is 
changing the character of ownership. Moreover, given the rapid rise of 
condominium as a prominent, and, if existing trends continue, soon-to-be 
dominant form of property within cities, then it will come more generally to 
define the nature of property in land. Condominium will be the paradigm for 
ownership of land, not simply a particular form among many. 
However, the paradox of condominium property, to borrow from 
Joseph Singer, 70  is that the embedding of property imbues condominium 
owners with the collective capacity to disembed themselves from a larger 
public realm. Indeed, condominium shares with other forms of common 
interest community the capacity, perhaps even the propensity, to turn owner 
attention inwards, to the concerns and interests of the community of owners 
that these property regimes create. To some extent, this turning inwards is 
inevitable and necessary; the owners, as co-owners of the common property, 
have an interest in, and are responsible for, maintaining the common 
property on which their private property depends. But one consequence is to 
precipitate a disembedding of that community, and the owners within it, from 
the larger public realm. 
There is a considerable literature, most of it drawing on studies of 
suburban homeowners associations in the US, that describes the capacity of 
private residential governments to enable groups of owners to secede and, by 
doing so, to exacerbate socio-economic and racial divisions.71 Geographers 
who focus on condominium have turned their attention to this scholarship, 
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including Gilad Rosen and Alan Walks who argue that condominium is the 
principal mechanism fuelling the ‘expansion of privatopia to North America’s 
urban centres’.72 Sociologist Randy Lippert has done so as well, although to 
argue that condominium is more usefully understood as a site of myriad 
governing regimes than as another level of government which might secede.73 
Legal scholars engaged with condominium should also be asking whether 
condominium, as an architecture of ownership that embeds property within 
a community of owners, facilitates a problematic disembedding of property 
and its owners from the larger social and political context, perhaps 
contributing to the placelessness that Nicole Graham has argued confounds 
contemporary property law.74 If the embedding of property is changing the 
character of ownership, as I have argued here, then it is also important to ask 
how the potential to disembed a community of property owners might also 
change the character of ownership and what the effects of those changes 
might be. To begin to answer these questions requires an understanding of 
the institution of property as arising in the tension between individual and 
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